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The texts listed below under the common title "Political Ethics and metaphysical Ontology: 
Liberty, Justice and Good in post-modern Thinking", are the first result of a two-years long 
enquiry under the direction of the "Veritatis Splendor" Institute, Bologna, and of the recently-
born cultural department of the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), created in order to support 
and develop the cultural activities of the Roman Church. It is important to remark that this is 
only a first result, since other contributions will be issued (and published) soon. Some of them 
are still under the author’s revision. 
The aim of the project is to open a discussion on the state of the Western world after the death of 
ideologies within the contemporary philosophical thought, with particular regard to the anglo-
saxon area (the so called "analytic" thinkers), although the European "continental" thinkers are 
involved as well. The fall of the Berlin wall, in 1989, appeared to be the beginning of a new era: 
the end of a long-lasting nightmare, and the Western world of liberal tradition promptly 
presented itself as the only candidate capable of ruling the whole planet. The recent carnage of 
September 11th has been but the last sign that it might not be as simple as that: and thus we all 
have to reconsider many of our precedent short- and long-termed forecasts. We are now forced to 
think in global terms, after and well beyond the facts in Genua. After the collapse of the 
communist galaxy, another kind of foe has appeared on the scene, disguised in different, and far 
from being more pleasant, garments. The problem of the corrupted relation between North and 
South must be added - in a tragic guise - to that of the yet dramatic relation between West and 
East, which is characterised by the not unrelevant detail of being deeply connected with 
international terrorism. The whole image of our fragile cohabitation on earth, with its 
outstanding inequality and its tremendous injustice, could now be said complete. And there is 
still China awaiting... 
Faced with such serious problems, the debate on liberty, justice and good seems to be but a 
matter for idle intellctuals. Honestly, it is not. On the contrary, such an enquiry lies at the very 
gist of all these questions, since it constitutes their very ground. International terrorism is indeed 
nourished - though, of course, unconsciously - by the lack of liberty and justice (and, implicitly, 
of good) which characterises the relations between nations, and claims to take care - though, 
again, with inexcusable acts - of the rejected ones, of the forgotten ones, of the violated, of the 
massacred, of those abandoned with impudent light heart by the West to deadly diseases, to 
famine, to starvation: that same opulent West which fights obesity by seeking refuge in its 
overcrowded gym halls. 
In this work, some common opinions have been carefully analysed, with due respect for the 
personal convictions of the writers. The three, ancient words - Liberty, Justice and Good —have 
helped us to agree on what, in these different opinions, is properly common, i.e. remains 
identical. Common is the close tie between truth and good (Sequeri); common is to consider 
liberty not as the pure arbitrary exercise of free will, but as the choice of values which are both 
right and shared (Botturi); common is the idea of everyone’s to strive for an individual self-
identity of his/her own, not at the expenses of the self-identity of others, but on the contrary with 
constant relation to others (Pinkus). This very relation to the other human beings, moreover, 
should find its goal in the recognition of their being "transcendental" subjects as well. This 
implies an effort of widespread solidarity (Totaro, De Sandre), since the latter is possible only on 
the basis of mutual recognition (Vigna). Common is the constant attention that the circle of good 
and justice may be interrupted: in this case, justice would turn out to be but a mere neutral 
procedure, incapable of putting an end to injustice and even, sometimes, allowing it to be 
perpetrated. The three ancient words cannot be comprehended but in their necessary, circular tie. 
But they still conserve an inner order of precedence, and an inner law: the Self may certainly 
blossom, but not separately from the life of the others, and viceversa. 
All these issues have been constantly in touch, and illustrated in strict comparison with the post-
modern climax, with its fragilities, but also with its request for new forms of freedom and with 
its aspiration to a different kind of universalism (Ferrara). The group of enquiries on the most 
outstanding representatives of the post-modern thinking (Bataille, by Chiurco; Cacciari, by 
Catapano; Vattimo, by Grion) have enabled a critical re-discussion of the so-called "weak 
thought" (Vattimo), of the "necessary" recall to permanent conflictuality in human existence 
(Cacciari), of the apparently invincible and liberatory charm of transgression and excess 
(Bataille). 
In order to illustrate the ultimate meaning of our enquiry, it is worth pointing out that a question 
still remains in the background: why is a reference to metaphysical ontology necessary in order 
to deal with such topics as ethics, and political ethics in particular? Because the post-modern age 
is essentially unified by something different, and within it. It is unified by an opposition - openly, 
the opposition to metaphysical ontology, to any theoretical defence of a necessary, indisputable 
ground for every and each argument. Such categories have, for post-modernism, a very precise 
name: they bare — deeply and essentially rooted in themselves - the mark of violence. It is this 
common "foe" the only thin trait d' union among the various souls of postmodernism — this and 
nothing else. Without such a foe, all these souls would be hopelessly damned to an unavoidable 
fragmentation. By paradox, therefore, it is but the incontrovertible truth, together with the idea of 
(shared) good, that protects post-modernism against itself, against its suicidal wreckage into 
uncomprehensibility, into a way of thinking which, by denying any solid basis from which to 
start from, cannot be but fanciful. 
Thus we looked at what Truth and Good are (Freedom and Justice depending on them), we tried 
to understand them, and thus we let them conduce our enquiry. Or, at least, this has been our 
wish from the very beginning.  
